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This doctoral thesis deals with sickness absence and 
economic incentives. It analyzes how economic incentives, 
as set by policymakers, shape the decisions of employees to 
go on sick leave. 
Despite its enormous relevance, the causes and conse-
quences of workplace absences due to sickness are an under-
researched fi eld in economics to date. While there are a large 
number of studies that build upon correlates of sick leave 
behavior, studies that convincingly identify how incentives 
causally affect sick leave behavior are scarce. 
In Germany, 4 percent of contracted labor is lost every 
year due to sickness absence (Badura, Schröder, and Vetter 
2008). According to data from the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), German 
employees take an average of 16.5 days of sick leave per 
year, while the average number of days of sick leave varies 
drastically among OECD countries between 4.1 (United 
States) and 29.2 (Slovakia) (OECD Health Data 2006). 
Currently, German employers spend about €25 billion per 
year for statutory employer-provided sick pay. This sum 
exceeds 1 percent of the total GDP. In addition, the public 
health insurance fund pays out about €6 billion annually for 
the long-term sick (German Federal Statistical Offi ce 2009). 
To obtain a complete picture of the total amount of benefi ts 
paid due to work disability, one would need to add spending 
by private health insurance companies, disability insurance, 
and accident insurance, which replaces income losses due to 
work-related disability or accidents.
However, simply summing up the total benefi ts severely 
underestimates the total economic costs of sickness absence. 
For example, if the institutional framework is unable to 
prevent employees on temporary long-term sick leave 
from becoming permanently disabled, the economy loses a 
valuable qualifi ed labor force. Especially in times of demo-
graphic change and a shrinking workforce, one crucial chal-
lenge of the social insurance system is to maintain employ-
ees’ capacity to work as long as possible. 
To draw on another example about how sick leave behav-
ior may trigger indirect but important side effects, think 
about an ineffi cient sickness insurance system. On the one 
hand, particularly when benefi t levels are generous, one may 
suspect that shirking behavior plays a substantial role. In 
other words, the fraction of employees who go on sick leave 
despite being able to work may be substantial. On the other 
hand, especially when benefi t levels are less generous or the 
unemployment rate is high, presenteeism may be of impor-
tance. In other words, when a large proportion of employees 
go to work despite being sick, this may lead to spillover 
effects at the workplace due to the spreading of diseases. 
While most of these underlying causes and individual 
reasonings are diffi cult to unravel empirically, this thesis 
intends to shed some light on various aspects of how sick 
leave behavior is shaped. I analyze how sick leave behavior 
is affected by economic incentives that are varied by differ-
ent policy reforms. 
At the same time, I attempt to derive conclusions about 
the importance of the institutional setting for successful 
implementation of such reforms. Moreover, it is primarily 
the institutional setting that determines which actor carries 
the fi nancial burden through the legal obligation to provide 
benefi ts. Since employers in Germany are obliged to provide 
sick pay for up to six weeks, I provide evidence on how 
policy reforms impact labor costs and how the labor market 
might adjust to such shocks in those costs. 
The thesis consists of fi ve independent chapters. Each 
chapter represents one research study and evaluates at least 
one specifi c policy reform in Germany. The unifying aspects 
of all studies, and hence this thesis, are the following. First, 
each chapter deals with sickness absence behavior and 
economic incentives. Second, each chapter evaluates policy 
reforms that were implemented in the mid-1990s in Ger-
many. Third, each chapter builds upon the only data set that 
contains representative sick leave information for the whole 
of the German population: the Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP). Finally, each chapter makes use of the most recent 
microeconometric evaluation methods, which can be classi-
fi ed as “reduced-form” or “nonstructural.”
Chapter 1 evaluates how a cut in the replacement level 
of the statutory sickness insurance in 1996 affected the sick 
leave behavior of private sector employees.1 Here, I also 
approximate the impact on labor costs and calculate potential 
employment effects, one of the main reform objectives. 
Chapter 2, which is unpublished and is my job market 
paper, evaluates how the reversal of the reform in 1999 
affected sick leave behavior and labor costs. In this chapter, 
I make use of the rich SOEP data set to provide evidence on 
the underlying driving forces of the behavioral reactions and 
on heterogeneity in the reform effects. By characterizing the 
employees who were mainly responsible for the causal reac-
tions, I also provide evidence on the potential signifi cance 
of shirking behavior and presenteeism. Lastly, this chapter 
presents empirical evidence on how employers might have 
reacted to the shock in labor costs in a rigid labor market 
with strict dismissal protection. 
Chapters 1 and 2 also serve as examples of how reform 
intention and actual reform implementation of labor market 
reforms may diverge in a labor market that is characterized 
by Bismarckian corporatism and a high degree of collec-
tive bargaining. The organizational structure of such labor 
markets restricts policymakers to merely setting federal 
minimum standards. However, they have no control over the 
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actual reform enforcement on the fi rm level, which enhances 
the risk of unpopular reforms failing. The main fi ndings from 
the fi rst two chapters, which both analyze short-term sick 
leave behavior, are summarized below.
First, employees clearly adapt their short-term sick leave 
behavior to changes in sick leave benefi ts. In 1996, the Ger-
man legislature cut the statutory sick leave replacement level 
for private sector employees from 100 to 80 percent of fore-
gone gross wages. This measure led to a fall in the average 
number of sick leave days of about 12 percent. Reversing the 
reform in 1999 increased average sick leave days by almost 
the same amount, namely by 10 percent. The response to the 
reform suggests that moral hazard plays a substantial role in 
the statutory sickness insurance and in the lower tail of the 
sickness spell distribution. 
Interestingly, the two reforms triggered behavioral reac-
tions in different parts of the sickness day distribution. The 
cut in benefi ts primarily induced employees to move from 
very few to zero absence days per year—the proportion of 
employees having zero absence days increased by about 8 
percent. Contrarily, the expansion of benefi ts induced primar-
ily unhealthy employees with more than 10 annual sick leave 
days to take more days off.
Whether the behavioral effects were primarily triggered 
by shirkers and employees who went on sick leave although 
they were able to work, or by presenteeism and employees 
who went to work although they were sick, remains an open 
question. I present empirical evidence that is in line with 
each of the two explanations. 
Second, changing statutory sick leave benefi t levels in an 
economy that is characterized by Bismarckian corporatism 
may lead to unintended side effects. Since policymakers can 
only vary federal minimum standards, their infl uence on how 
reforms are enforced on the fi rm level is limited. Employers 
are free to provide fringe benefi ts over and above statutory 
minimum standards. In the course of the fi rst reform that 
reduced sick pay, it became clear that German society values 
a high level of statutory sick leave. A replacement level that 
falls behind what employees usually earn is considered to be 
unsocial by the majority of the Germans. The unpopular cut 
in sick pay provoked strikes and mass demonstrations. 
Eventually, many employers agreed in collective wage 
agreements upon a voluntary provision of 100 percent sick 
leave. Estimates suggest that between 1997 and 1999, only 
half of all private sector employees effectively experienced 
a decrease in actual sick pay. In this particular reform, the 
divergence between reform intentions as envisioned by the 
policymakers and actual reform implementation was substan-
tial. In 1999, large parts of the reform were reversed. 
To take this noncompliance in the empirical specifi cations 
into account, I reviewed all existing collective agreements 
of that time. Based on their industry and actual sick leave 
scheme, I then assigned employees to different additional 
treatment and controls groups, which I used in more refi ned 
specifi cations. These additional models and robustness 
checks confi rm my main fi ndings.
Third, changes in the sick pay levels directly translate into 
changes in labor costs because, in Germany, employers alone 
are legally obliged to pay for statutory sick leave. My calcu-
lations suggest that the changes in the level of statutory sick 
pay by 20 percentage points represented labor cost changes 
of approximately €1.5 billion per year, considering that only 
half of all employees’ sick pay was effectively cut. 
In a completely fl exible labor market, economic theory 
would suggest that these exogenous shocks in labor costs 
would directly and immediately translate into changes in 
employment. Relating the estimated changes in labor costs to 
the fi ndings of other studies for Germany that used general 
equilibrium models to estimate the relationship between 
labor costs and employment, the employment dimension of 
the sick leave reforms equates to around 50,000 jobs, relative 
to 30 million employees. 
However, since employment protection is high in Ger-
many, employers were likely to react to the shocks in labor 
costs in other ways. I present empirical evidence suggesting 
that in the aftermath of the increase in statutory sick pay, 
overtime hours increased and wages decreased in the private 
sector relative to other sectors.
Chapter 3 evaluates how a cut in statutory long-term sick 
pay affected the sick leave behavior of the long-term sick. I 
did not fi nd any evidence that long-term sickness absence of 
over six weeks is characterized by monetary considerations. 
In other words, the long-term sick do not adapt their sick 
leave behavior to economic incentives. Evaluating the effects 
of a cut in statutory long-term sick pay from 80 to 70 percent 
of foregone gross wages in 1997, I did not fi nd any empirical 
evidence for behavioral reactions. 
A theoretical model confi rms this fi nding under the 
assumption that the long-term sick are seriously ill. Thus, 
moral hazard seems to be less of an issue in the upper tail of 
the sickness spell distribution. 
One explanation for this fi nding is the moderateness of 
the cut in long-term sick pay, which represented on aver-
age 7 percent of the net wage. Another explanation is linked 
to the severity of the underlying illness. While short-term 
sick leave is mainly determined by fl u and minor ailments, 
the main catalysts of long-term sickness absence are can-
cer, chronic diseases, or mental illnesses. It is plausible that 
employees diagnosed with cancer, or who are mentally ill, 
are not very responsive to economic incentives. 
Chapter 4 deals with convalescent care treatments. Con-
valescent care therapies at health spas involve periods of at 
least three weeks of workplace absence for employees.2 The 
chapter shows that the demand for convalescent care treat-
ments is price responsive. The decision by the government to 
double the daily copayments for convalescent care treat-
ments from 1997 onward induced a decrease in the demand 
of these therapies of about 20 percent. 
Diss. booklet 2011.indd   Sec1:2 11/8/2011   3:13:20 PM
2011 Dissertation Summaries 3
Since the question of the price elasticity of demand for 
medical care is a central economic question, I derive the 
following price elasticities: the price elasticity for medical 
rehabilitation therapies to avoid permanent work disability 
is inelastic and lies around −0.3. Slightly smaller but still 
inelastic is the price elasticity for medical rehabilitation 
therapies to recover from accidents at work. According to 
my calculations, it is about −0.5. Conversely, I fi nd the price 
elasticity for preventive therapies at health spas to be less 
than −1 and thus elastic. 
The last chapter of the thesis shows how effective direct 
policy measures are in comparison to indirect measures. 
Direct policy measures such as increasing copayments unam-
biguously and universally affect the target population. Indi-
rect measures such as cutting statutory sick pay or widening 
the options for employers to cut paid vacation in the event of 
long sick leave simply decrease social minimum standards. 
While increasing copayments was very effective in 
dampening the demand for convalescent care, the other cost 
containment instruments were less effective. I did not fi nd 
any evidence that the newly introduced option for employers 
to cut paid vacation in case of sickness absence due to con-
valescent care was effective. There is no empirical evidence 
for the notion that this measure reduced the demand for 
convalescent care therapies at health spas. Likewise, the cut 
in statutory sick pay did not reduce the demand for convales-
cent care therapies. 
I have two main explanations for these last two fi ndings. 
First, the cut in paid vacation may have had no effect since 
many employees use some or all of their vacation days for 
convalescent care in any case. Although entitled to take paid 
sick leave in addition to their paid vacation, many employees 
fear negative job consequences, especially when unemploy-
ment rates are high. Second, the cut in sick pay was not 
necessarily a binding constraint for most employees since 
they might have faced a decision of going to rehabilitation or 
simply staying at home to recover. They would have been on 
sick leave anyway.
Overall, evaluating fi ve different policy reforms and their 
effects on sick leave behavior, I show that short-term sick 
leave behavior in particular is responsive to economic incen-
tives. For sickness periods of over six weeks, I did not fi nd 
such evidence. Policymakers should consider the institu-
tional setting and potential side effects when implementing 
reforms. When policymakers are in a position to vary param-
eters that directly and universally affect the target population, 
the likelihood of successful implementation of the reform 
is high. As long as policymakers can only vary minimum 
standards in the regulatory framework of the economy, many 
actors within the institutional framework may successfully 
prevent the enforcement of the reform as intended by the 
policymakers. This is especially true of unpopular reforms. 
Notes
1.  Chapter 1 is published as “A Natural Experiment on Sick Pay 
Cuts, Sickness Absence, and Labor Costs” (Ziebarth and 
Karlsson 2010).                     
2.  Chapter 4 is published as “Estimating Price Elasticities of Con-
valescent Care Programmes” (Ziebarth 2010).
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